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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Sherman Storage LLC ("Sherman") filed suit to eject Respondent Global 
Signal Acquisitions II ("Global") from a 50 feet by 12.33 feet strip of land in Kootenai County, 
Idaho, which Global currently uses as a portion of a cell tower site. Sprint Spectrum, L.P ., 
("Sprint") originally entered into a 1996 lease for the land at issue with the then owner, the 
Wallace Family Trust. The 1996 lease depicted the lease area as a trapezoid shaped piece of real 
property having dimensions of 50 feet x 50 feet x 53 feet x 35 feet. The lease area was depicted 
as being adjacent to the East boundary of 24th Street. Ex. A to Ex. A-1. Attached as Exhibit B to 
the lease is a Memorandum of PCS Site Agreement which describes the lease area as being 
"located to the East of and adjacent to the abandoned 24th Street right-of-way .... " The only 
explanation for the lease area being depicted as being adjacent to the East boundary of 24th Street 
is that the parties believed that the East boundary of the street was the East boundary of the right-
of-way. The parties later learned that the East boundary of the right-of-way was located 12.33 
feet East of the curb of the physical street. 
At the time this suit was initiated, Shennan did not hold title to the strip of real property 
originally at issue but, during the pendency of a summary judgment motion, Sherman acquired 
both the strip and the remaining fee interest in the remaining property subject to the lease, 
together with additional property. After acquiring that property, Sherman persisted in its quest to 
eject Global from the cell tower site. At the conclusion of the trial where the trial court acted as 
the trier of fact, the trial court concluded that Global is entitled to occupy the cell tower site at its 
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present location as depicted in the lease for the duration of the lease and that Sherman is not 
entitled to any of the relief it sought. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Global supplements Sherman's Course of Proceedings as follows: 
Global filed a Motion for Summary Judgment early in the case on January 4, 2010 
asserting that Sherman did not have an ownership interest in the 12.33 feet by 50 feet strip from 
which it sought to eject Global. While that motion was pending, Sherman negotiated with and 
paid the Wallace Family Trust $300,000 for real property which included the area depicted in the 
lease. The Trial court later ruled that Sherman did not have title to the subject property until 
June 9, 2012, after the transfer. 
The trial court awarded Global a portion of its attorney's fees and costs and entered its 
Second Amended Final Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Case Against Defendant and Awarding 
Attorney's Fees and Costs on July 25, 2013. R. p. 1609. Global filed an Amended Partial 
Satisfaction of Judgment on July 26, 2013 after Sherman paid the monetary portion of the 
Judgment without condition or reservation. R. p. 1616. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On April 10, 1987, Gary A. Wallace and Mary Jo Wallace established the 
Wallace Family Trust. Ex. H-1; R. p. 2. 
2. On February 19, 1988, the Idaho Transportation Department conveyed to the 
Wallace Family Trust, by Warranty Deed, Lots 3 and 4, Block 22, Glenmore Addition to 
Coeur d'Alene. Ex. C-3. 
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3. On October 17, 1989, the City of Coeur d'Alene vacated the 24th Street right-of-
way where it abuts Lots 3 and 4 in Block 22, and Lots 1 and 12 in Block 21, Glenmore 
Addition to Coeur d'Alene. Ex. C-4. 
4. At the time of the City of Coeur d'Alene's October 17, 1989 vacation of the 24th 
Street right-of-way, the adjacent property owner to the West of 24th Street (Lots 1 and 12, 
Block 21, Glenmore Addition) was Mary Jo Wallace, an individual. R. p. 794. After vacation, 
by operation oflaw, the West half of the vacated 24th Street right-of-way attached to Lots 1 and 
12, Block 21, Glenmore Addition. R. p. 794. 
5. At the time of the City of Coeur d'Alene's October 17, 1989 vacation of the 24th 
Street right-of-way, the adjacent property owner to the East of 24th Street (Lots 3 and 4, Block 
22, Glenmore Addition) was the Wallace Family Trust. R. p. 794. After vacation, by operation 
of law, the East half of the vacated 24th Street right-of-way attached to Lots 3 and 4, Block 22, 
Glenmore Addition. R. p. 794. 
6. Exhibit F-1 depicts the site in question in 1995 before the cell tower site was 
constructed. 
7. On June 14, 1996, Gary Wallace and Mary Jo Wallace, on behalf of the Wallace 
Family Trust, entered into a PCS Site Agreement with Global's predecessor in interest, Sprint. 
R. p. 794; Ex. A-1. 
8. The PCS Site Agreement provides for approximately a 2,500 square foot ground 
lease of Lot 4, Block 22, Glenmore Addition to Coeur d'Alene together with an easement for 
ingress and egress. R. p. 794; Ex. A-1. 
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9. The location of the lease area provided for in the PCS Site Agreement is 
described and depicted in the "Site Description" attached as Exhibit A to the PCS Site 
Agreement. Ex. A-1, ,r 1. 
10. The lease site as depicted in Exhibit A to the PCS Site Agreement depicts a 50' x 
50' x 53' x 35' trapezoid shaped site located 17 feet East of the centerline of 24th Street, and 6 
feet West of the East boundary of Lot 4. Ex. A-1. The West boundary of the lease area is 
depicted as being the East boundary of the then existing and actual 24th Street. See attached 
Addendum A. 
11. On July 9, 1996, a Memorandum of PCS Site Agreement in the form attached as 
Exhibit B to the PCS Site Agreement was recorded in the Records of Kootenai County for the 
sole purpose of "evidenc[ing] that a lease was made." Ex. C-5. 
12. The description of the lease area contained in Exhibit B to the PCS Site 
Agreement is not consistent with the Site Description attached as Exhibit A to the PCS Site 
Agreement. Ex. A-1. Exhibit B describes the lease area as being "located to the East of and 
adjacent to the abandoned 24th Street right-of-way ... " The only explanation is that the parties 
believed that the East boundary of the street was the East boundary of the right-of-way. 
13. During 1996, the actual and physical 24th Street remained in existence as a 
paved roadway with curbs having a total width of approximately 35 feet. The entire right-of-
way of 24th Street, including the actual paved street and curbs, has a total width of 
approximately 60 feet. Ex. E-21; Ex. 1-1, p. 45, LL. 10-47, L. 6. 
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14. Lot 4, excluding the abandoned right-of-way, consists of more than 3,000 square 
feet. Tr. Vol. I, p. 241, L. 21. That portion of the abandoned right-of-way of 24th Street that 
attached to Lot 4 is an additional 3,226.30 square feet, (Calculation derived from Exhibits D-8 
and D-9), resulting in a total area in excess of 6,226 square feet. The 50 feet x 12.33 feet strip 
of land that is part of the lease area and is located to the East of the then actually existing 24th 
Street but within the abandoned right-of-way of 24th Street consists of 616.50 square feet. 
15. The parties never intended that all of Lot 4 would be subject to the lease. The 
desired lease area was to be 50 feet square having 2,500 square feet. Due to the lack of depth 
of the property between the East boundary of 24th Street and the East property line, the 
trapezoid shape was developed which contains 2,124 square feet. 
16. The only two surveyors who testified at the trial in this matter, Doug Black and 
Walter Dale, both agree that the cell tower as contemplated and configured in the PCS Site 
Agreement could not fit entirely on Lot 4 without extending to the curb of 24th Street. Ex. I-1, 
p. 69, LL. 10-16; Tr. Vol. II, pp. 246-247; Ex. D-32. 
17. In Exhibit A to the PCS Site Agreement, the parties agreed that Sprint, at 
Sprint's option, may replace that exhibit with another exhibit setting forth the legal description 
of the property on which the Site is located and/or an as-built drawing depicting the Site. 
18. Douglas Black, PLS, performed a survey of the subject property to prepare a 
legal description for the lease site on August 13, 1996. Ex. E-21. 
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19. Douglas Black's survey of the lease area was based on information and a 
diagram that was virtually identical to the diagram used in the Site Description attached as 
Exhibit A to the PCS Site Agreement. Ex. I-1, pp. 44-45. 
20. On January 22, 1997, Douglas Black prepared and recorded a Record of Survey 
for the purpose of monumenting the lease area described in the Site Description attached as 
Exhibit A to the PCS Site Agreement. R. 795; Ex. C-6, p. 57, L. 1. See attached Addendum B. 
21. In the summer of 1996, Sprint built the cell tower site as depicted in the Record 
of Survey, and the Site Description attached as Exhibit A to the PCS Site Agreement, which 
accurately depicts the location of the lease area as being on Lot 4, Block 22, and the East 12.33 
feet of the vacated 24th Street right-of-way. Ex. C-6; Tr. Vol. II., p. 187, L. 15-p. 188, L. 23. 
22. Randy Labeff, the project engineer who created the construction plans for the 
cell tower site in 1996, designed the site to be adjacent to the existing curb of vacated 24th 
Street which included the East 12.33 feet of the vacated 24th Street right-of-way. Tr. Vol. II., p. 
189,L.3-p.190L.21. 
23. As part of the PCS Site Agreement, in 1996 Sprint paid the Wallace Family 
Trust's past and then current tax assessments on the entirety of Lot 4 and the East half of the 
vacated 24th Street right-of-way. Exs. A-1, H-3; Ex. 50, pp. 90-91. 
24. As originally constructed in 1996, the Cell Tower Site was enclosed by a six ( 6) 
feet high chain link fence enclosing a 35 feet x 35 feet area. R. 1335; Tr. Vol. II., p. 190, L. 
22-p. 191, L. 5. While the amount of the area enclosed has increased, the area enclosed has 
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never exceeded the lease area in Exhibit A of the lease, nor has the fence line along the East 
curb of 24th Street changed in location. Exs. F-2, F-3, F-4 and F-5. 
25. Exhibit F-2 depicts the cell tower in 2001 and is how the site appeared after 
construction in 1996. Tr. Vol. IL, p. 197, L. 10 - p. 198, L. 8. 
26. Global and its predecessor Sprint continuously paid rent for the lease area 
located on Lot 4 and the East 12.33 feet of the vacated 24th Street right-of-way, to the Wallace 
Family Trust, from June of 1996 through July of 2010 and thereafter to Sherman. Exs. G-1 and 
G-2. 
27. The Wallace Family Trust continuously accepted Global's and its predecessor 
Sprint's payment of rent totaling $172,786.40 on a portion of Lot 4 and the East 12.33 feet of 
the vacated 24th Street right-of-way, from June of 1996 through June of 2010. Exs. G-1 and G-
2; R. 1336. 
28. On April 23, 2001, both Gary Wallace and Mary Jo Wallace, on behalf of the 
Wallace Family Trust, executed an Amendment to PCS Site Agreement, wherein the Wallace 
Family Trust agreed to the co-location of Ubiquitel and Verizon Wireless on the subject lease 
area in exchange for the receipt of additional monthly rent of $300.00. Ex. A-2; R. 1335. 
29. On September 19, 2001, both Gary Wallace and Mary Jo Wallace, on behalf of 
the Wallace Family Trust, executed another Amendment to PCS Site Agreement, wherein the 
Wallace Family Trust agreed to the co-location of Cricket on the subject lease area in exchange 
for the receipt of additional monthly rent of $350.00. Ex. A-3; R. 1335. 
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30. On January 25, 2002, the Wallace Family Trust and Sprint executed a 
"Memorandum Agreement" which identifies the cell tower site as located on a tax parcel 
number that applies to both lot 4, Block 22 and the East half of vacated 24th Street. The exhibits 
to the 2002 Memorandum Agreement depict the West boundary of the cell tower site as being 
the East boundary of vacated 24th Street as opposed to the right-of-way. Ex. A-4; R. 1335. See 
attached Addendum C. 
31. On September 19, 2002, Mary Jo Wallace, an individual, transferred to Sherman 
Self Storage, Inc., by Warranty Deed, Lots 1-12, Block 21, Glenmore Addition to Coeur 
d'Alene. The Warranty Deed by and between Mary Jo Wallace, an individual, and Sherman 
Self Storage, Inc., did NOT include the East half of vacated 24th Street. Ex. C-7. 
32. On October 24, 2003, Sherman Self Storage, Inc. filed a quiet title action only 
against Mary Jo Wallace, individually, regarding the East half of vacated 24th Street not 
included in the September 19, 2002 Warranty Deed. R., p. 33,214 
33. On May 10, 2005, the Wallace Family Trust entered into an Agreement 
Regarding Ground Lease with Sprint, therein reaffirming by Estoppel Certificate that no breach 
or default existed under the PCS Site Agreement and all amendments. Ex. A-5, ,i 2. 
34. On June 7, 2005, Global was assigned this lease by Sprint. Ex. C-9; Tr. Vol. II, 
p. 266, LL. 12-19. Global had nothing to do with the site until 2005. Global is wholly owned 
by Crown Castle as of 2007 when Crown acquired approximately 10,000 cell tower sites, 
including the subject site. Tr. Vol. II, p. 268, L. 10-23. 
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35. On December 23, 2005, Kirk Evans, on behalf of Sherman, entered into a 
Purchase and Sale Agreement with Sherman Self Storage, Inc., for the purchase of Lots 1-12, 
Block 21, Glenmore Addition to Coeur d'Alene, which did NOT include the East half of 
vacated 24th Street. Ex. J-4. 
36. On April 7, 2006, Shennan Self Storage, Inc. transferred to Sherman, by 
Corporate Warranty Deed, Lots 1-12, Block 21, Glenmore Addition to Coeur d'Alene which 
did NOT include the East half of the vacated 24th Street right-of-way. Ex. C-12. 
3 7. At the time of Sherman's purchase of the adjacent storage facility, the cell tower 
s enclosed by a six-foot tall fence topped by barbed wire on three sides and a building on the 
South side. Tr. Vol. I, p. 63, LL. 15-21; Tr. Vol. II, p. 131, LL. 3-21; Ex. F-5. 
38. Mr. Evans knew he was not buying any of the property within the fenced cell 
tower site. Tr. Vol. II, p. 132, LL. 4-21. 
39. The policies of title insurance obtained by Sherman as part of the $4 million 
dollar transaction for the storage unit facility did NOT contain any of the land upon which the 
cell tower site is located. Tr. Vol. II, p. 132, L. 16 -p. 133, L. 19. 
40. On May 1, 2006, Mary Jo Wallace, individually, and Sherman Self Storage, 
Inc. entered into a Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement respecting the East half of 
vacated 24th Street. Ex. 25. 
41. The May 1, 2006 Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement specifically 
provides that "Wall ace shall have an easement to access the existing cell tower on her 
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remaining property consistent with the existence of the present easement for that purpose, as set 
forth on attached Exhibit A. 11 Ex. 25. 
42. Exhibit A to the May 1, 2006 Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement 
provides for "[a] legal description for ingress - egress easement located on 24th Street along 
Block 22, Glenmore Addition, Kootenai County, Idaho", described as follows: The East half of 
the vacated 24th Street along the West boundary of the remainder of Lots 3 and 4, Block 22 ... 
excluding that portion of land described in a Record of Survey, Book 18, Page 404, Records of 
Kootenai County, Idaho" which is the same document as Exhibit C-6 which depicts the 
original, historical and present location of the cell tower site partially located on the right-of-
way. Id. 
43. The May 1, 2006 Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement referenced and 
acknowledged the Record of Survey that establishes Global's existing cell tower lease area 
located on a portion of Lot 4 and the East 12.33 feet of the vacated 24th Street right-of-way. 
Ex. C-6. 
44. The Wallace Family Trust never disputed the location of the lease area nor 
Global and its predecessor Sprint's access, use, and improvement of the lease area. Id. Ex. 49, 
p. 132,LL.4-9,p. 139,LL.4-17;Ex.50,p. 102,LL.8-15,p. 126,LL. 7-10. 
45. On May 4, 2006, the District Court entered a Final Order in Case No. CV-03-
7690, quieting title to only the East half of 24th Street, in Sherman Self Storage, Inc., only as 
against Mary Jo Wallace individually who was a stranger to the title to the East half of 24th 
Street. R. 45. 
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46. On June 7, 2006, Sherman Self Storage, Inc., without consideration, transferred 
to Sherman, by Quitclaim Deed, only the East half of 24th Street. Ex. C-14; Tr. Vol. II., p. 136, 
L. 1 -p. 137, L. 25. 
47. Because Sherman Self Storage, Inc. did not have valid title to either the East half 
of 24th Street or the vacated right-of-way, the June 7, 2006 Quitclaim Deed to Sherman did not 
transfer valid title to the East half of 24th Street or the right-of-way. R. 800. 
48. On November 17, 2008, The Wallace Family Trust executed a Letter Agreement 
whereby it accepted $100 and was prepared and willing to accept a $7,100 signing bonus to 
extend the lease term until 2041 at the present location of the cell tower site. Tr. Vol. II, p. 279, 
LL. 14-280, L. 21; Ex. H-21; Ex. 50, p. 127, LL. 5-18. 
49. On May 19, 2009, Sherman filed its Complaint for ejection, against Global, as to 
the East 12.33 feet of the vacated 24th Street right-of-way. R. 47. Global filed an answer with 
various affirmative defenses and counter-claims, and a third party complaint against The 
Wallace Family Trust. R. 49. 
50. Global filed its original motion for summary judgment on January 4, 2010. Tr. 
341. While Global's motion for summary judgment was still pending, on April 16, 2010, the 
Wallace Family Trust executed and delivered to Sherman a Warranty Deed conveying the 
"Easterly ½ of Vacated 24th Street." Ex. C-16. The Wallace Family Trust's April 16, 2010 
Warranty Deed was provided without consideration. Tr. Vol. I., p. 103, L. 6-10. 
51. On May 11, 2010, Sherman entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement with 
the Wallace Family Trust for the purchase of Lots 3 and 4, Block 22, Glenmore Addition to 
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Coeur d'Alene for $300,000.00 while Global's Motion for Summary Judgment was pending. 
Tr. 797; Ex. H-26. 
52. On May 25, 2010, The Wallace Family Trust executed and delivered to Sherman 
Storage, LLC a warranty deed conveying Lots 3 and 4, Block 22, Glenmore Addition to Coeur 
d'Alene. Ex. C-17. By operation of law, this deed would include the East half of the vacated 
24th Street right-of-way laying beyond the actual street to the extent that this area was not 
deemed included within the April 16, 2010 deed to the "Easterly½ of Vacated 24th Street." 
53. On June 9, 2010, the Warranty Deeds described in paragraphs 50 and 52 above 
were recorded in the records of Kootenai County. Exs. C-16 and C-17. 
54. Sherman had actual knowledge of the lease area located on a portion of Lot 4, 
Block 22, and the East 12.33 feet of the vacated 24th Street right-of-way when it acquired Lots 
3 and 4, Block 22, and the East half of the vacated 24th Street in June of 2010. R. 1339; Tr. 
Vol. II., p. 146, LL. 1-21. 
55. Sherman had actual knowledge of the terms of the 1996 PCS Site Agreement, 
1997 Record of Survey, 2002 Memorandum of Agreement, and 2005 Agreement Regarding 
Ground Lease when it acquired Lots 3 and 4, Block 22, and the East half of the vacated 24th 
Street right-of-way in June of 2010. Id. 
56. Global has continuously paid rent for the entire lease area to Sherman, from and 
after June of 2010 and Sherman has continuously accepted Global's payment of rent since June 
of 2010. R. 1336; Ex. G-2; Tr. Vol. I, p. 116, LL. 14-16. 
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57. Global has paid more in rent than Sherman's claimed damage for the alleged 
encroachment from June of2010 through trial. Tr. Vol. II., p. 152, LL. 3-20. 
58. From 1996 through the trial, the cell tower site has remained in the exact same 
location, partially on Lot 4 and the East 12.33 feet of vacated 24th Street right-of-way. Ex. E-
21; Ex. D-32, Tr. Vol. II, p. 201, L. 5 -p. 202, L. 9; Tr. Vol. II, p. 245, L. 13 -Tr. Vol. II, p. 
249, L. 25. 
59. The trial court awarded Global attorney's fees and Sherman paid the monetary 
portion of the judgment without condition or reservation. R. p. 1616. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
In order to assist the Court, Global restates the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Whether the trial court's conclusion that "the location of the cell tower site has not 
changed since originally built" is supported by evidence introduced at trial. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in deciding that there was no material breach of the 
PCS Site Agreement by Global or its predecessors. 
3. Whether the trial court properly found that Sherman was on notice of all issues 
related to the alleged encroachment at the time it came into title of property in question on 
June 9, 2010. 
4. Whether the trial court properly applied the doctrine of Boundary by Agreement 
to the long-term lease. 
5. Whether the trial court properly applied Global's equitable defenses. 
6. Whether the trial court properly rejected Sherman's unclean hands theory. 
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7. Whether the trial court properly awarded attorney's fees and costs. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
8. Did the trial court err in denying Global's mutual mistake defense? 
9. Did the trial court err in ruling on summary judgment that the leased area was 
located to the East of and adjacent to the abandoned 24th Street right-of-way? 
10. Did Sherman waive the issue of the trial court's attorney's fees award by 
unconditional payment of the monetary portion of the judgment? 
11. Is Global entitled to attorney's fees on appeal? 
ARGUMENT 
I. Standard of Review 
This matter was tried to the lower court, which acted as the trier of fact. Review of the 
trial court's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, 
and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing 
Co., 119 Idaho 946,812 P.2d 253 (1991). A trial court's findings of fact in a court-tried case will 
be liberally construed on appeal in favor of the judgment entered, in view of the trial court's role 
as trier of fact. Lindgren v. Martin, 130 Idaho 854, 857, 949 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1997); Sun Valley 
Shamrock Resources, Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 1 I 8 Idaho 116, 118, 794 P.2d 1389, 1391 
(1990). It is the province of the district judge acting as trier of fact to weigh conflicting evidence 
and testimony and to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Abbott v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 
119 Idaho 544, 808 P.2d 1289 (1991); l.R.C.P. 52(a). If the findings of fact are based on 
substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, they will not be overturned on appeal. 
Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148, 953 P .2d 588 (1998). However, this Court exercises free 
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review over the lower court's conclusions of law to determine whether the court correctly stated 
the applicable law, and whether the legal conclusions are sustained by the facts found. Burns v. 
Alderman, 122 Idaho 749, 752-53, 838 P.2d 878, 881-82 (Ct. App. 1992). 
II. The Trial Court's Factual Finding that "The Location of the Cell Tower Site Has 
Not Changed Since Originally Built" is Supported by Evidence Introduced at Trial 
and Should Not be Disturbed on Appeal. 
After all the evidence was submitted, the trial court found that "[a] portion of the Cell 
Tower Site was enclosed by a six (6) feet high chain link fence. . . . The location of the Cell 
Tower Site has not changed since originally built, though fencing and access has changed." R. 
1335. Despite Sherman's assertions to the contrary, this factual finding is supported by 
substantial evidence and should not be disturbed on appeal. 
Randy Labeff (Labeff) is a civil engineer who designed the cell tower construction plans 
in 1996. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 176-177, LL. 3-24. Labeff created the construction documents from 
site schematics that located the 50' x 50' x 53' x 35' trapezoid lease area 17 feet East of the 
centerline of vacated 24th Street. Exs. E-9, E-10, E-11; Tr. Vol. II, p. 187, LL. 15-23. Labeff 
also used a survey created by the original surveyor, Doug Black, to create the cell tower site at its 
current location and the location of the trapezoid never changed. Ex. E-21; Tr. Vol. II, p. 187, L. 
24-p. 188, L. 23. The cell tower site was built directly next to the then existing curb of vacated 
24th Street and originally contained a 35' x 35' fenced area when built. Ex. E-12, p. 2; Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 189, LL. 18-190, L. 8. 
Labeff testified that the cell tower site has not moved from 1996 to the date of trial 
although there have been some minor internal modifications. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 198-202. Labeff 
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testified that he was "as confident as you can be" that the cell tower site was built in accordance 
with Doug Black's survey and the site depiction contained in Exhibit A to the PCS Site 
Agreement. Tr. Vol. II, p. 214, L .9-17; Ex. E-21. 
Walter Dale (Dale) is a professional land surveyor retained as an expert by Global. Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 215. Dale surveyed the cell tower site in November of 2008 after Sherman alleged 
there was an encroachment. Tr. Vol. II, p. 239, LL. 13-17. Dale conducted a survey of the lease 
area stamped on March 10, 2011. Ex. D-30; Tr. Vol. II, p. 234. Dale found all the survey 
monuments placed by Doug Black who conducted the 1996 survey. Tr. Vol. II, p. 241, LL. 3-
18. Based on the survey monuments in place since 1996 the cell tower site has always been 17. 7 
feet from the centerline of 24th Street. This is a difference of 8.4 inches from the location 
depicted on Exhibit A to the PCS Site Agreement, which used a distance of 17 feet to the East of 
the centerline. Tr. Vol. II, p. 244, LL. 3-8, p. 246, LL. 2-8; Ex. E-21. The cell tower site is in 
the same location as the Record of Survey recorded by Doug Black in 1996. Ex. C-6; Tr. Vol. II, 
p. 249, L. 25-p. 251, L. 16. 
Since it was the province of the trial court to weigh the credibility of the witnesses at 
trial, the finding that the cell tower site has not moved since originally constructed in 1996, 
should be liberally construed in favor of the trial court's findings which should not be disturbed 
on appeal. Hunter v. Shields, supra. 
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III. The Trial Court Properly Found that Sherman was Aware of All Issues Related to 
the Alleged Encroachment at the Time it Came Into Title of the Property in 
Question on June 9, 2010. 
A party acquiring property without exchanging valuable consideration, or acqumng 
property with actual or constructive notice of any outstanding adverse right of another, is not a 
bona fide purchaser, and thus takes said property subject to all outstanding adverse rights. See 
Sun Valley Land and Minerals, Inc., v. Burt, 123 Idaho 862, 866, 853 P.2d 607 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Where no consideration is exchanged, the acquiring party takes the property subject to all 
adverse interests whether recorded or secret. See Boller v. Sun Valley Shamrock Resources, Inc., 
119 Idaho 1060, 1063, 812 P.2d 1221 (Ct. App. 1990); Haugh v. Smelick, 126 Idaho 481, 483, 
877 P.2d 26 (1993). 
It is a settled matter that Sherman did not come into title to the East half of the vacated 
24th Street right-of-way until June of 2010, as Sherman has not appealed that finding. R. 800, 
814. This finding should not be disturbed on appeal. By that date, Global had filed a summary 
judgment motion and Sherman had received hundreds of pages of discovery in this case 
including all four of the Amendments to the PCS Site Agreement, which included the 
January 25, 2002 Memorandum of Agreement Exhibit A-4 and the May 10, 2005 Agreement 
Regarding Ground Lease which contained an Estoppel Certificate executed by the Wallace 
Family Trust. Ex. A-5, ~ 2. These records reveal the current and historic location of the lease 
area, and reveal the fact that Sprint and the Wallace Family Trust intended for the cell tower site 
to be located exactly where it has always been. 
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When Sherman took title to the East half of the vacated 24th Street right-of-way in June 
of 2010, by warranty deed from the Wallace Family Trust, Sherman took said property with full 
and actual knowledge of Global's interest. Further, to the extent that Sherman acquired 
ownership of the vacated right-of-way under the April 16, 2010 warranty deed to "the Easterly 
1/2 of Vacated 24th Street" said property was acquired by Sherman without paying any 
consideration and Sherman thus took said property subject to all adverse rights of Global 
whether recorded or secret. Tr. Vol. I., p. 103, LL. 6-10. That is, the warranty deed conveying 
the East half of the vacated 24th Street was executed by the Wallace Family Trust on April 16, 
2010 and was not part of the purchase and sale agreement by and between Sherman and the 
Wallace Family Trust executed almost a month later on May 11, 2010. Exs. C-16, C-17 and H-
26. Both Kirk Evans and Mary Jo Wallace concede that no consideration was paid for the 
April 16, 2010 Deed from the Wallace Family Trust to Sherman. Tr. Vol. I., p. 103, LL. 6-10. 
Because Sherman was not a bona fide purchaser of the East half of the vacated 24th Street right-
of-way, it took said right-of-way subject to Global's interest. 
IV. The Trial Court Properly Applied the Doctrine of Boundary by Agreement to a 
Long Term Lease. 
1. Elements of Boundary by Agreement 
The doctrine of Boundary by Agreement or Acquiescence exists where there is (1) an 
unknown, uncertain or disputed boundary, and (2) a subsequent agreement fixing the boundary. 
Sims v. Daker, 154 Idaho 975,303 P.3d 1231 (2013). 
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2. Uncertain or Disputed Boundary. 
The doctrine rests upon uncertainty concerning location of the true boundary. Huskinson 
v. Nelson, 152 Idaho 547, 272 P.3d 519 (2012); Gameson v. Remer, 96 Idaho 789, 537 P.2d 631 
(1975). Where the location of the true boundary line is unknown to both of the parties, and is 
uncertain or in dispute, such conterminous owners may fix the boundary by agreement. Sims v. 
Daker, supra; Hyde v. Lawson, 94 Idaho 886, 889, 499 P.2d 1242 (1972). Thus, where 
uncertainty exists, agreement binds the consenting parties. Gameson v. Remer, supra; Huskinson 
v. Nelson, supra. 
In most cases involving a boundary by agreement or acquiescence, the underlying facts 
are that the parties did not know the actual location of the true boundary on the ground, and then 
agreed upon a location of the boundary on the ground. In this case, the uncertainty of the true 
boundary lies in the lease itself, being the PCS Site Agreement. Ex. A-1. This lease never 
purported to contain a full and complete and legal description of the leased property. Instead, it 
contained two conflicting descriptions of the property, one in Exhibit A in which the leased 
property is depicted as commencing at the East boundary of the then physically existing 24th 
Street, being 17 feet East of the centerline of the street, and one in Exhibit B which was designed 
to be, and was, a Memorandum of PCS Site Agreement, which was designed to give record 
notice that: 
Such Agreement provides in part that Owner leases to SSLP a certain site ("Site") 
located to the East of and adjacent to the abandoned 24th St. right-of-way at the 
Sherman A ve./1-90 overpass. City of Coeur d'Alene, County of Kootenai, State 
of Idaho, within the property of Owner which is described in Exhibit A attached 
hereto .... 
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Thus, the description of the property in Exhibit B incorporates the description contained 
in Exhibit A, and contains the discrepancy as to whether the leased property begins at the East 
boundary of the actual paved street, being 17 feet East of the centerline, or at the East boundary 
of the right-of-way for this street, being 29.33 feet East of the centerline. Because the parties 
always agreed upon the actual location of the boundary of the leased property on the ground, 
being adjacent to the East boundary to the actual existing street, that agreement must stand. 
3. Agreement or Acquiescence. 
An unknown, uncertain, or disputed boundary is fixed by subsequent agreement, which 
may be express or implied. That is, "[t]he agreement may be either express or implied by the 
landowners' conduct." Flying Elk Investment, LLC v. Cornwall, 149 Idaho 9, 232 P.3d 330 
(2010). Acquiescence is regarded as competent evidence of the agreement. Id. Specifically, an 
agreement will be presumed to arise between neighbors where "such a right has been definitely 
defined by erection of a fence .... followed by such adjoining landowners treating [ the fence] as 
fixing the boundary for such length of time that neither ought to be allowed to deny the 
correctness of its location" Dreher v. Powell, 120 Idaho 715,718,819 P.2d 569 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Allowing an adjoining landowner to improve the disputed land is also evidence of an agreement. 
Stafford v. Weaver, 136 Idaho 223, 225, 31 P.3d 245 (2001). Moreover, "[a] long period of 
acquiescence by one party to another party's use of the disputed property provides a factual basis 
from which an agreement can be inferred." Downey v. Vavold, 144 Idaho 592, 595, 166 P.3d 
382 (2007). 
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4. The Boundary was Agreed to and Accepted by the Parties. 
Where a lease area is unknown, uncertain, or in dispute due to a misunderstanding by the 
original parties or for any other reason, as here, the boundaries of the lease area may be agreed to 
by the original parties. In this case, there was uncertainty, lack of knowledge, or a 
misunderstanding on the part of the Wallace Family Trust and Sprint. Mary Jo Wallace, Trustee 
for the Wallace Family Trust, testified that she neither knew where the boundaries of Lot 4 or the 
vacated 24th Street right-of-way were, nor where the boundaries between Lot 4 and the vacated 
24th Street right-of-way were. Mary Jo Wallace testified as follows: 
Q. In 1996, you did not know exactly where the boundary line was 
between lot four and the East half of 24th Street right-of-way, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Ex.50,p.96,LL. 19-22. 
A. It was - we had not had a survey done on the property. We had - I 
had no idea of where the - the curb fell .... 
Q. You didn't do anything to verify that -
A. No. 
Ex. 49, p. 57, LL. 14-17, LL. 21-24. 
Q. Wouldn't 17 feet East of the centerline be 13 feet into the right-of-
way? 
A. I don't know where the right-of-way was. 
Ex. 49, p. 63, LL. 11-14. 
Q. Before this lawsuit did you understand where lot 4, just lot 4, 
where the boundary - the West boundary of lot 4 was? Did you have an idea -
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A. No. 
Ex. 49, pp. 63, 64, LL. 4-7. 
Moreover, Mary Jo Wallace testified that it was her understanding that the 
cell tower site was constructed where it was intended, as provided in the PCS Site 
Agreement. 
Q .... did you realize that any part of the cell tower or its fence was on 
24th Street? 
A. I did not. 
A. ... I felt that it was what it was, exactly what the documents called 
for .... 
Ex. 50, p. 70, L. 23-p. 71, L. 1. 
Thus, the agreement to fix the location of the lease area on Lot 4 and the East 12.33 feet 
of the vacated 24th Street right-of-way is clearly evidenced by the parties' conduct and their 
uninterrupted acquiescence should be regarded as competent evidence of the agreement. 
The parties' conduct and their acquiescence is further illustrated by: (1) Sprint payment 
of past and then current tax assessments on Lot 4 and the East half of vacated 24th Street in 1996, 
(2) the Record of Survey dated January 22, 1997, which was recorded on January 31, 1997 as 
Instrument No. 1478042, (3) the Amendment to PCS Site Agreement dated April 23, 2001, (4) 
the Memorandum of Agreement dated January 25, 2002, (5) the Agreement Regarding Ground 
Lease and the Estoppel Certificate contained therein, dated May 10, 2005, and the November 17, 
2008 Letter Agreement. Exs. A-1, A-2, A-4, A-5, C-6, H-3, and H-21. 
Indeed, on January 25, 2002, the Wallace Family Trust Agreed that: 
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The portion of the Parcel which is effected by the Agreement, as modified (the 
"Site") is described or depicted in Exhibit B annexed hereto and may include 
certain additional easement, rights and appurtenances. 
Exhibit A-4 depicts the exact historical location of the cell tower site, partially upon the 
vacated 24th Street right-of-way, but changed the access easement. The changing of the access 
easement obviously necessitates a specific location of the cell tower site at its current location. 
Further, since 1996, Global and its predecessors have continuously accessed and used the 
subject property, improved the property, and the Wallace Family Trust has never disputed or 
denied said access and use. Ex. 50, p. 126, LL. 7-14. 
It was also recognized in testimony in 2003 by Mary Jo Wallace, individually, that 
Global's predecessor's access to the cell tower site must not be encumbered by any judgment of 
the Court. Ex. 29; Ex. 25, p. 2; Ex. 50, p. 114, L. 6, 10-15. 
Finally, The Wallace Family Trust and Sherman have continuously, without interruption, 
accepted rent of over $200,000 for the entire lease area paid by Global and its predecessors since 
1996. Exs. G-1 and G-2. 
5. An Established Boundary is Binding on Subsequent Owners. 
Once a boundary line is established by agreement or acquiescence, it is binding upon 
successors in interest who purchase with notice of the agreement. Herrmann v. Woodell, l 07 
Idaho 916, 921, 693 P.2d 1118 (Ct. App. 1985); See also Anderson v. Rex Hayes Family Trust, 
145 Idaho 741, 185 P.3d 253 (2008). Moreover, one purchasing property is put on notice as to 
any claim of title or right of possession which a reasonable investigation would reveal. Weitz v. 
Green, 148 Idaho 851, 230 P.3d 743 (2010). A party has notice of the agreement if there is a 
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fence marking the agreed upon boundary line and the property owners are using the property up 
to said fence. Herrmann v. Woodell, supra. 
Global's cell tower cite has always been surrounded by a 6' chain link fence which 
encloses a number of structures and a cell phone tower monopole of more than 100 feet in 
height; which together put Sherman on notice of the agreed upon lease area. Exs. D-22 - D-27, 
F-2, F-3, F-4. Moreover, when Sherman ultimately acquired the subject property in June of 
2010, it was by then intimately familiar with the universe of documents describing and depicting 
the lease area as being located on Lot 4 and a portion of the East half of the vacated 24th Street 
right-of-way, and particularly the Estoppel Certificate contained in the May 10, 2005 Agreement 
Regarding Ground Lease. Ex. A-5, ,r 2. For these reasons, Sherman acquired the East half of the 
vacated 24th Street right-of-way in 2010 subject to Global and the Wallace Family Trust's 
agreement that the lease area be located on a portion of said vacated 24th Street right-of-way. 
In its Decision re Court Trial (R. p. 1341-1342) the trial court wrote: 
The doctrine of boundary by agreement, however, has only been applied to 
matters regarding adjacent land owners, not in regards to the interpretation of a 
long term cell tower lease and a land owner. However, this Court finds that 
expansion of the doctrine of boundary by agreement may be appropriate in this 
limited case because the dispute regards a fenced real estate boundary that has 
stood, and will stand, for a significant period of time. 
The trial court was correct in its application of the doctrine. It is important to recognize 
that this was not a dispute between one owner of a parcel of property and the lessee of a second 
parcel of property from a separate fee owner. Here the owner of the entire parcel has always 
been the same as the lessor of the cell tower site, with the possible exception of the time between 
April and June 2010, when Sherman could argue that the April 16, 2010 deed to "the Easterly½ 
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of Vacated 24th Street" included the East half of the entire abandoned right-of-way. Such an 
interpretation, however, would clearly be beyond the intention of the Wallace Family Trust. The 
application by the court of the Doctrine of Boundary by Agreement to this limited case is 
appropriate. 
V. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Deciding there was No Material Breach of the PCS 
Site Agreement by Global or its Predecessors. 
At summary judgment, the trial court interpreted the PCS Site Agreement as providing 
that the leased area was to be located to the East of and adjacent to the abandoned 24th Street 
right-of-way. This would result in an encroachment of 12.33 feet. At trial, the trial court found 
that the boundaries of the leased area had been established by the application of the Doctrine of 
Boundary by Agreement or Acquiescence to fix the boundaries as they have always existed and 
been located upon the ground. Thus, the true and legal boundaries of the leased area have now 
become the boundaries of the cell tower site as actually located on the property. Flying Elk 
Investment, LLC v. Cornwall, supra. As such, it would appear that the current location of the 
cell tower site could no longer constitute an encroachment or breach of the PCS Site Agreement. 
The trial court further found that even if the boundaries were considered to be an encroachment, 
the location of the cell tower site would not be a material breach of the PCS Site Agreement. 
Global submits that the trial court was correct in this ruling. 
Lot 4, as augmented by the abandoned 24th Street right-or-way, consists of over 6,226 
square feet. The Wallace Family Trust agreed to lease to Sprint approximately 2,500 square feet 
of this property. The leased area became a trapezoid 50' x 50' x 53' x 35' and consisted of only 
2,124 square feet. Of this area, only 616.5 square feet are located within the abandoned right-of-
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way. None of the cell tower site is located within the physical boundaries of the former actual 
improved surface of 24th Street. 
In State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520, at 523, 198 P.3d 749 (Ct. App. 2008) the Court of 
Appeals defined a material breach of contract as follows: 
A material breach of contract is a breach so substantial and fundamental that it 
defeats the object of the parties in entering into the contract. There is no material 
breach of contract where substantial performance has been rendered. Substantial 
performance is performance which, despite deviation from the contract or some 
omission, provides the important and essential benefits of the contract to the 
promise. 
A substantially similar description of a material breach was announced in J P. Stravens 
Planning Assoc., Inc. v. City of Wallace, l 29 Idaho 542, at 545, 928 P .2d 46 (Ct. App. 1996) in 
which the Court of Appeals stated: 
A substantial or material breach of contract is one which touches the fundamental 
purpose of the contract and defeats the object of the parties in entering into the 
contract. A breach of contract is not material if substantial performance has been 
rendered. Substantial performance is performance which, despite a deviation 
from contract requirements, provides the important and essential benefits of the 
contract to the promise. Whether a breach of contract is material is a question of 
fact. ( citations deleted). 
In Ervin Const. Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695, 874 P.2d 506 (1994) this Court held 
that rescission of a contract is available only when one of the parties has committed a material 
breach which destroys the entire purpose of entering into the contract. Rescission is not 
available where the breach of the contract is only incidental and subordinate to the main purpose 
of the contract. The Court also noted that whether a breach of contract is material is a factual 
question. 
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The role of the Court in reviewing a trial court's determination of whether or not a breach 
of contract is material was discussed in Mountain Restaurant Corp. v. ParkCenter Mall Assoc., 
122 Idaho 261, 833 P.2d 119 (Ct. App. 1992). The Court described its role on review as follows: 
Whether a breach of contract is material is a question of fact. Our role in 
reviewing a factual finding of material breach is limited. We do not weigh the 
evidence, nor do we substitute our view of the facts for the view of the trial judge. 
We merely determine whether the finding is supported by substantial, albeit 
conflicting, evidence in the record. If so, the finding cannot be deemed clearly 
erroneous. We regard evidence as "substantial" if a reasonable trier of fact would 
accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been 
proven. 
Mountain Restaurant C01p., 122 Idaho at 265 (citations deleted). 
In Mountain Restaurant Corp., the shopping center had agreed to provide a minimum of 
500 parking spaces in a lease to a restaurant. The shopping center in fact provided 387 parking 
spaces during the time prior to 5 p.m. on weekdays, and only provided the 500 spaces after 
5 p.m. on weekdays and on weekends. The decision of the trial court that this was not a material 
breach was affirmed on appeal. Likewise, work by contractors which contained defects was 
found to be not a material breach of the contract and did not destroy the entire purpose of the 
contract in both Ervin Const. Co., supra, and Tentinger v. McPheters, 132 Idaho 620, 977 P.2d 
234 (Ct. App. 1999). 
The trial court found that locating 616.5 square feet of the cell tower site upon a portion 
of the abandoned right-of-way did not constitute a material breach of the lease and did not defeat 
the fundamental purpose of the lease, which was to provide for a cell tower site in exchange for 
the payment of rent. Since 1996, Global and Sprint have paid all rental payments due under the 
lease, totaling $205,777 at the time of trial. Exs. G-1 and G-2. Documents executed by the 
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Wallace Family Trust subsequent to 1996 acknowledge that the location of the cell tower site 
was not a breach of the lease. Exs. A-4, A-5, H-21. 
Under the PCS Site Agreement, Sprint was granted an access easement to the cell tower 
site across the remaining Wallace Family Trust property to which the Wallace Family Trust was 
granted the right to relocate the access subject to the agreement as to the proposed relocated 
access by Sprint. Ex. D to Ex. A-1. The parties agreed to a relocated access during 2002. Ex. 
A-4. Access, however, has always been provided to the West boundary of the cell tower site 
through the abandoned actual 24th Street former road surface. In reliance upon the 2002 
relocated access, Sprint constructed a building along the southern edge of the cell tower site that 
blocks any access to the site directly from Sherman Avenue. The trial court was correct in 
finding that Sherman cannot build or store anything on the 17 feet between the centerline of 
former 24th Street and the cell tower site because of the access easement on that strip. While 
Sherman argues on appeal that it has the right to relocate the access easement to free 24th Street 
entirely, Shennan is inconect. Relocation is subject to the agreement of Global and based upon 
the construction of the building in reliance upon the first relocation, Global would not consent to 
any relocation that would necessitate the removal or destruction of the building. 
The finding of the trial court that there was no material breach of the lease agreement is 
supported by substantial evidence and cannot be deemed clearly enoneous. The finding should 
thus be affirmed by this Court. 
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VI. The Trial Court Properly Applied Global's Equitable Defenses. 
The trial court found that Sherman is estopped from ejecting Global from the cell tower 
site because of the equitable doctrines of Laches and Estoppel. These findings are supported by 
the evidence introduced at trial and should not be disturbed on appeal. 
1. The Equitable Defense of Estoppel and Quasi-Estoppel Bind Sherman as 
Successor-In-Interest to the Wallace Family Trust. 
The trial court ruled that even if there is a material breach where the boundary of the cell 
tower site was not set by agreement, Global correctly argued that Sherman is estopped from 
ejecting Global from the cell tower because of laches. As set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court 
"The defense of laches is a creation of equity and is a specie of equitable estoppel. The decision 
to apply laches is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." Sword v. Sweet, 140 
Idaho 242, 249, 92 P.3d 492, 499 (2004) (citation deleted). The Doctrine of Latches may be 
applied to a successor in interest against either the principal or the successor if the successor took 
title to the property with knowledge of the claim. Almo Water Co. v. Darrington, 95 Idaho 16, 
501 P.2d 700 (1972). As argued above, Sherman took title to the cell tower site in June of2010 
with knowledge of the PCS Site Agreement, the current location of the cell and the agreements 
between the Wallace Family Trust and Global or Sprint. The elements of estoppel by !aches are: 
(I) Defendant's invasion of plaintiffs rights; (2) Delay in asserting plaintiffs rights, the plaintiff 
having had notice and an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) Lack of knowledge by the defendant 
that the plaintiff would assert his rights; and (4) Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event 
relief is accorded to the plaintiff or the suit is not held to be barred. Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, 
Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 361, 48 P3d 1241, 1247, 1250 (2002). The Wallace Family Trust never 
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asserted its rights to the allegedly encroaching area even after it was placed on notice when Mary 
Jo Wallace observed the cell tower site being built and after signing additional agreements 
setting the boundary of this cell tower site, and in addition, the Wallace Family Trust's 
acceptance of substantial rental payments. 
Sherman is also estopped from ejecting Global from the East half of the vacated 24th 
Street right-of-way by the equitable doctrine of quasi-estoppel. "Quasi-estoppel prevents a party 
from asserting to another party's disadvantage a right that is inconsistent with a previous 
position." Grover v. Wadsworth, 14 7 Idaho 60, 205 P .3d 1196, 1200 (2009). "[T]he essence of 
the proper application of the doctrine of quasi estoppel is the focus of the Court's attention upon 
the specific facts and circumstances of the case at bar." KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279, 
282, 486 P.2d 992 (1971). "The doctrine applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a 
person to maintain a position inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced or of which he 
accepted a benefit." Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 427, 80 P.3d 1031 (2003) (citing, 
Eastern Idaho Agric. Credit Ass'n v. Neibaur, 133 Idaho 402, 410, 987 P.2d 314, 322 (1999). 
"The doctrine of quasi-estoppel is distinguishable from equitable estoppel in that no concealment 
or misrepresentation of existing facts on the one side, nor ignorance or reliance on the other, is a 
necessary ingredient." Schiewe v. Farwell, 125 Idaho 46, 49, 867 P.2d 920, 923 (1993); Keesee 
v. Fetzek, 111 Idaho 360, 362, 723 P.2d 904, 906 (Ct. App.1986). Quasi-estoppel may be 
asserted against both the Wallace Family Trust, and its successor Sherman. See Birdwood 
Subdivision Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Bulotti Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 117, 175 P.3d 179, 185 
(2007) (it is assumed that quasi-estoppel if applicable to predecessor, binds successor). 
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In this case, Sherman's action to eject Global from the East half of the vacated 24th Street 
right-of-way is inconsistent with the 14 year position of its predecessor to the PCS Site 
Agreement, the Wallace Family Trust, and thus it would be unconscionable to allow Sherman to 
maintain such an inconsistent position from the one under which both it and its predecessor 
accepted a benefit, gained an advantage, and produced a disadvantage to Global. Specifically, 
the Wallace Family Trust, as part of the PCS Site Agreement, permitted Sprint to pay off the 
Trust's past and current tax assessments on both Lot 4 and the East half of vacated 24th Street. 
Ex. D to Ex. A-1, H-3; Ex. 50, p. 90; Ex. 49, p. 91. The Wallace Family Trust accepted rent 
payments from Sprint and its successor from 1996 until it transferred the subject property to 
Sherman in 2010. All told, Global and its predecessor paid rent totaling $172,786.40 to the 
Wallace Family Trust and $29,502.14 to Shennan for an agreed upon 2,500 square feet lease 
area, of which only 2,124 square feet have been used. Ex. G-1 & G-2; Tr. Vol. III, p 194, L. 5-
p. 295, L. 2. 
The Wallace Family Trust also executed a number of amendments to the PCS Site 
Agreement. On April 23, 2001, both Gary Wallace and Mary Jo Wallace, on behalf of the 
Wallace Family Trust, executed an Amendment to PCS Site Agreement, wherein the Wallace 
Family Trust agreed to the co-location of Ubiquitel and Verizon Wireless on the subject lease 
area in exchange for the receipt of additional monthly rent of $300. Ex. A-2; Ex. 50, p. 105. In 
January of 2002, the Wallace Family Trust executed a Memorandum of Agreement that included 
a legal description of Lot 4, which under the Carney v. Heinson, 133 Idaho 275, 985 P.2d 1137 
(1999), presumption should include the East half of the vacated 24th Street right-of-way. Ex. A-4. 
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Mary Jo Wallace, Trustee for the Wallace Family Trust and Sherman's predecessor, 
Sherman Self Storage, Inc., were also well aware of the location of the lease area as evidenced 
by their April 26, 2006 Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement. The Agreement provides 
that "Wallace shall have an easement to access the existing cell tower on her remaining property 
consistent with the existence of the present easement for that purpose, as set forth on attached 
Exhibit A." Ex. 25; Ex. 50, p. 39. Exhibit A to the Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement 
provides for "[a] legal description for ingress - egress easement located on 24th Street along 
Block 22, Glenmore Addition, Kootenai County, Idaho, described as follows: The East half of 
the vacated 24th Street along the West boundary of the remainder of Lots 3 and 4, Block 22 ... 
excluding that portion of land described in a Record of Survey, Book 18, Page 404, Records of 
Kootenai County, Idaho." Ex. 25. The property excluded from the easement and described in 
the Record of Survey is Global's existing cell tower lease area located on Lot 4 and the East half 
of the vacated 24th Street right-of-way. Ex. C-6. The graphical depiction of the easement and 
lease area contained in Exhibit A to the Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement is consistent 
with the Record of Survey in clearly showing Global's existing cell tower lease area located on 
Lot 4 and the East half of the vacated 24th Street right-of-way. Compare, Exhibit B-10 and B-
l 4. For these reasons, Sherman is estopped from ejecting Global from the East half of the 
vacated 24th Street right-of-way. 
Mary Jo Wallace also testified that she and her husband Gary Wallace saw what the 
subject property looked like before construction of the cell tower site commenced, witnessed the 
construction of the cell tower site and fenced lease area, saw the cell tower site and fenced lease 
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area at the conclusion of construction in 1996, and witnessed changes to the fencing around the 
lease area, the location of the gate accessing the lease area, and the addition of a building within 
the fenced lease area. Ex. 50, pp. 22-23, 37, 39, and 102. In this case, there is no question that 
the lease area was constructed on a portion of the vacated 24th Street right-of-way, immediately 
adjacent to the paved street surface and curb of former 24th Street. Exs. F-1, F-2 and F-3. 
Labeff, the engineer who designed the cell tower testified it was built right next to the curb of 
24th Street pursuant to his plans in 1996. Ex. 3; Tr. Vol. II, p. 189, L. 3-p. 190, L. 21. Labeff 
based his construction plans on Doug Black's site survey. Id. The specific location of the tower 
site was important to obtain FAA approval. Ex. E-15. Necessarily, if the 24th Street right-of-
way is 60 feet wide, the paved portion of 24th Street is 35 feet wide, and the lease area was 
constructed and located immediately adjacent to the former paved portion of 24th Street, the 
lease area was obviously within the 24th Street right-of-way and the Wallace Family Trust was 
clearly aware of the location the cell tower site was built and has always been located. 
Finally, the injury or prejudice to Global if relief is accorded to Sherman would be 
substantial. Specifically, Jonathan Arrowood testified that it will cost $80,000.00 or more to 
reconfigure and move the cell tower site solely onto Lot 4, and substantially more to entirely 
relocate the cell tower site. Tr. Vol. III, p. 289, LL. 2-14. 
VII. The Trial Court Properly Rejected Sherman's Unclean Hands Theory. 
The parties always understood that the cell tower site was constructed at its intended 
location, being the site depicted in Exhibit A to the PCS Site Agreement. Ex. A-1. In all of the 
exhibits identified by Shennan containing a diagram or survey of the leased area, the leased area 
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is always depicted as set forth in Exhibit A to the PCS Site Agreement. At times, some of those 
exhibits indicate that the leased area, while located to the East of and adjacent to the actual 
improved surface of 24th Street, was located within 12.33 feet of the East half of the right-of-
way. Other diagrams and surveys do not identify the East boundary of the right-of-way. When 
written documents are used to describe the leased area, at times the words used was simply Lot 
4, which would generally include as a matter of law the East half of the abandoned right-of-way, 
and at other times the words were Lot 4 and that portion of 24th Street vacated by the City of 
Coeur d'Alene. Other written documents identified by Sherman as exhibits either attach the PCS 
Site Agreement as an exhibit describing the leased area, or simply failed to include any 
description. 
Sherman, in its brief, also includes statements that it attributed as either being made by, 
or evidenced the intention or understanding, of Sprint. These statements, however, were taken 
from the deposition testimony of Mary Jo Wallace as to her interpretation of what Sprint knew, 
intended, or did not know. None of Mary Jo Wallace's statements are competent to prove the 
knowledge or intentions of Sprint. Lastly, Sherman argues that "Global and Sprint are 
interchangeable for all purposes." Sherman's Brief, p. 4. There is nothing in the record to 
support that proposition. The two companies are separate and distinct legal entities. Global was 
assigned the lease by Sprint on June 7, 2005. There is nothing in the record that indicates any 
involvement by Global with Sprint prior to that date. 
All the exhibits identified by Shennan support the fact that the cell tower site was 
constructed where the parties intended. The only document containing contrary infonnation is 
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Exhibit B to the PCS Site Agreement, which describes the leased area as being to the East of and 
adjacent to the abandoned 24th Street right-of-way, and then depicts the leased area in its Exhibit 
A as being 17 feet from the centerline of 24th Street, and adjacent to the East boundary of the 
actual improved street. The trial court did not find that any failure by either Sprint or Global to 
convey to the Wallace Family Trust information regarding the inconsistencies contained in 
Exhibit B to the PCS Site Agreement was of such a nature to preclude Global from its equitable 
defenses. The trial court thus clearly did not abuse its discretion in applying the equitable 
defenses. 
VIII. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Global's Mutual Mistake Defense 
While the trial court's overall decision should be affirmed, Global contends that an 
alternate grounds for affirmation is Global's theory of mutual mistake. Reversing the trial court's 
ruling on Global's mutual mistake theory is properly raised as an additional issue on appeal 
pursuant to I.A.R. 1 l(g). 
1. Elements of Mutual Mistake. 
A court can properly reform an instrument when the evidence shows that "the instrument 
does not reflect the intentions of the parties and that such failure is the product of a mutual 
mistake." Moore v. Mullan, 123 Idaho 985, 987, 988, 855 P.2d 70 (Ct. App. 1993). A mutual 
mistake occurs when (1) both parties, (2) at the time of contracting, (3) have a misconception 
about a basic assumption or vital fact. Moore v. Mullan, supra. The parties to the PCS Site 
Agreement at the time of execution were Sprint and the Wallace Family Trust. At the time of 
contracting, there was a misconception between the parties as to whether the cell tower site 
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would be located solely on Lot 4, or on Lot 4 and a portion of the East half of the vacated 24th 
Street right-of-way that had attached to Lot 4 by operation of law. Ex. I-1; pp. 54-55. 
In 1996, the Wallace Family Trust was not aware of the precise location of the 
boundaries of Lot 4 or of the vacated 24th Street right-of-way. Ex. 50, p. 20 and 96; Ex. 49, pp. 
57, 63, 64-65 and 76-77. While Mary Jo Wallace conveniently claimed to understand the 
difference and significance between the width of a paved street surface and a right-of-way, there 
is nonetheless a common misconception among lay persons regarding the difference in the width 
of a street and the width of a street right-of-way. Ex. I-1; p. 45, LL. 10-19. Platted rights-of-
way in the relevant part of Coeur d'Alene are 60 feet wide while the paved streets are 35 feet 
curb to curb, 17 ½ feet on either side of the centerline. Ex. I-1, pp. 45-4 7. This cell tower site, 
as depicted in the Site Description attached as Exhibit A to the PCS Site Agreement, is 17 feet 
East of the centerline of vacated 24th Street, adjacent to the vacated 24th Street paved street 
surface and street curb, and partly on the vacated 24th Street right-of-way. Ex. I-1, pp. 46-48. 
The cell tower site, as monumented by surveyor Douglas Black, is located adjacent to the 
vacated 24th Street paved street surface and street curb, and partly on the vacated 24th Street 
right-of-way. Ex. C-6 and I-1, p. 55. As surveyed and monumented by Douglas Black, and as 
constructed, the cell tower site is located adjacent to the vacated 24th Street paved street surface 
and street curb, partly on the vacated 24th Street right-of-way and 17 feet 8 ½ inches East of the 
centerline of vacated 24th Street. Ex. I-1, pp. 54-55, 59. Moreover, no portion of the cell tower 
site was ever constructed on the paved surface of vacated 24th Street. Ex. 50, p. 101. 
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The Site Description attached as Exhibit A to the PCS Site Agreement, the Record of 
Survey, and the actual location of the cell tower site conflict only with the description of the cell 
tower site contained in Exhibit B to the PCS Site Agreement (the Memorandum of PCS Site 
Agreement), which describes the cell tower site as being located adjacent to the 24th Street right-
of-way. Ex. A-1. Moreover, Exhibit B's own attached Exhibit A contradicts Exhibit B's legal 
description by depicting the cell tower site as being located 17 feet East of the centerline of 
vacated 24th Street, identical to the Site Description attached as Exhibit A to the PCS Site 
Agreement, and the Record of Survey. Ex. A-1. Subsequent amendments executed by the 
Wallace Trust, including a January 25, 2002 Memorandum of Agreement, similarly use only a 
Lot 4 legal description together with a graphical depiction of the lease area located on the East 
half of the vacated 24th Street right-of-way. Ex. A-4. 
This Court should rule that the trial court should have granted Global Mutual Mistake 
Defense as an additional rationale to affirm the trial court. If Global's cell tower site was not to 
be located partly on the East half of the vacated 24th Street right-of-way, Lot 4 could not have 
been used to accommodate the trapezoidal lease area contemplated by the parties, and would 
necessarily frustrate and defeat the purpose of the ground lease. Ex. I-1, p. 54. It is thus a basic 
assumption or vital fact of the PCS Site Agreement that Global's cell tower site be situated on 
both Lot 4 and the East half of the vacated 24th Street right-of-way, adjacent to the vacated 24th 
Street paved street surface and street curb, and not adjacent to the entire right-of-way. 
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IX. The Trial Court Erred when Ruling on Summary Judgment that the Lease Area is 
to the East of and Adjacent to the Abandoned 24th Street Right-Of-Way. 
This issue is raised as an additional issue on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 1 l(g). In both the 
trial court's ruling on summary judgment (R. p. 792) and ruling on reconsideration (R. p. 1206) 
the trial court found that the lease area was defined in the lease as being located to the East of 
and adjacent to the 24th Street right-of-way. Global submits that the Court erred in this finding 
and that pursuant to the terms of the lease, the lease area was located to the East of and adjacent 
to the East boundary of 24th Street as then in actual existence, being 17 feet to the East of the 
centerline of the street and 12.33 feet to the West of the East boundary of the right-of-way. The 
PCS Site Agreement is the lease between the parties. Ex. A-1. Exhibit A to the PCS Site 
Agreement is the Site Description for the lease. That description clearly and unambiguously 
depicts the leased area as the trapezoid shape commencing 17 feet to the East to the centerline of 
24th Street. 
A lease of real property is a conveyance or an encumbrance of real property. Thompson 
v. Ebbert, 144 Idaho 315, 160 P.3d 754 (2007); lntermountain Realty Co. v. Allen, 60 Idaho 228, 
90 P.2d 704 (1939). A memorandum oflease is merely a document that may be recorded to give 
notice of the existence of the lease. Thompson v. Ebbert, supra. The PCS Site Agreement 
provides that: "If requested by SSLP, Owner agrees promptly to execute and deliver to SSLP a 
recordable Memorandum of this Agreement in the form of Exhibit B .... " Ex. A-1, ,r 15(c). 
Exhibit B to the PCS Site Agreement is the Memorandum of PCS Site Agreement that 
was subsequently recorded to give record notice that a lease had been made. The Memorandum 
of PCS Site Agreement had attached to it its own Exhibit A, which is identical to the Exhibit A 
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attached to the lease agreement itself. Thus, while Exhibit B describes that the lease area is 
located to the East of and adjacent to the abandoned 24th Street right-of-way the exhibit attached 
to Exhibit B depicts the lease area as being located 17 feet to the East of the 24th Street 
centerline. The document creating the lease interest is the PCS Site Agreement together with the 
Site Description contained at Exhibit A. The memorandum of lease contained in Exhibit B did 
not create any interest in real property. 
In construing a contract, the Court must look to the actual language of the contract. 
Absent any ambiguity, the Court must enforce the contract according to its plain terms. Potlatch 
Educ. v. Potlatch Sch. Dist., 148 Idaho 630, 226 P.3d 1277 (2010). When a legal instrument is 
found to be unambiguous the legal affect must be decided by the Court as a matter of law. In the 
event that an instrument is found to be ambiguous, the interpretation of the contract is an issue of 
fact to be found by the trier of fact. Whether or not an ambiguity exists in a legal document is of 
itself a question of law, over which this Court exercises free review. Knipe Land Co. v. 
Robertson, 151 Idaho 449,259 P.3d 595 (2011). 
Global submits that there is nothing ambiguous about the description of the lease area in 
the PCS Site Agreement and Exhibit A thereto, which is the document that created the lease. 
The trial court erred in ruling that the description used in the memorandum of lease, which did 
not create any estate in real property, and was contradicted by the exhibit to the memorandum, 
superseded the clear unambiguous description in the actual lease. In the exercise of free review 
of a question of law, this Court should find the area subject to the lease is the area depicted in 
Exhibit A to the PCS Site Agreement. Alternatively, this Court may find that the area subject to 
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the lease is ambiguous as a matter of law, and that the issue then became a question of fact that 
was resolved by the trial court in favor of Global on the basis of the trial court's findings on the 
Doctrine of Boundary by Agreement or Acquiescence. 
X. Sherman Waived the Issue of the Trial Court's Attorney's Fees Award by Voluntary 
Payment of the Monetary Portion of the Judgment. 
In this case, Sherman simply paid the attorney's fees awarded by the court without 
condition or reservation and Global filed a Partial Satisfaction of Judgment. R. p. 1616. A party 
who voluntarily satisfies a debt incurred by a proceeding acquiesces to the judgment and that 
portion of the judgment cannot be reviewed. People ex. Rel. Neilsen v. Wilkens, 101 Idaho 394, 
614 P .2d 417 (I 980). Idaho law is clear that the voluntary satisfaction of any portion of a 
judgment extinguishes the right to appeal that portion of the judgment. People ex rel. Neilson v. 
Wilkins, supra. In this case, Sherman has waived its appeal of the monetary portion of the 
judgment. 
XI. The Trial Court Properly Awarded Attorney's Fees. 
The trial court properly found that Global was the prevailing party in the underlying 
litigation under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l). R. 1441. A determination on prevailing parties is committed 
to the sound discretion of the trial court. Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating and 
Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 718, 117 P .3d 130, 132 (2005). 
In this case the trial court properly awarded Global costs as a matter of right in the total 
amount of $9,846.80 pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C). R. 1443. The court also found that 
reasonable attorney's fees are authorized under the contract. R. 1445. In particular, the PCS Site 
Agreement, Exhibit A-1 contains the following paragraph: 
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15. Miscellaneous. 
(f) The prevailing party in any action or proceeding in court or mutually agreed 
upon arbitration proceeding to enforce the terms of this Agreement is entitled to 
received its reasonable attorneys' fees and other reasonable enforcement costs and 
expenses from the non-prevailing party. 
As such, the trial court properly awarded Global its reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
from the point in time Sherman became a party to the contract, June 10, 2010. R. 1445-1446. 
The trial court further properly found that Global was entitled to attorney's fees under LC. 
§ 12-120(3) since a commercial transaction was the gravamen of the lawsuit. Brower v. E.1. 
DuPont De Nemours and Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345, 349 (1990). R. 1446. The trial 
court also properly determined the amount of attorney's fees in the amount of $250,000 after 
considering all the factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). It is well established that the 
determination of the amount of an attorney's fee award is within the sound discretion of the 
court. Sun Valley Potato Growers v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 86 P.3d 475 (2004). 
The trial court's discretionary ruling awarding attorney's fees costs was determined through an 
exercise ofreason and should be affirmed. R. 1570-1573. 
XII. Global is Entitled to Attorney's Fees on Appeal. 
Paragraph 15(f) of the PCS Site Agreement, Exhibit A-1, provides that the prevailing 
party "is entitled to receive its reasonable attorneys' fees and other reasonable enforcement costs 
and expenses from the non-prevailing party." 
From the inception of this case, Sherman has sought to eject Global from the cell phone 
tower site and the East half of vacated 24th Street. Indeed, after the Amended Complaint was 
filed, Shennan sought to tenninate the PCS Site Agreement and eject Global from the East half 
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of the street and Lot 4. Global has always asserted that it was not in breach or substantial breach 
of the PCS Site Agreement and the amendments thereto. As such, if this Court rules that Global 
is entitled to stay on the current lease site through 2021, Global is the prevailing party on appeal 
for purposes of costs and attorney's fees. 
It is well established under Idaho law that attorney's fees can be awarded when provided 
by contract. Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc.,supra; LR.C.P. 54(e)(l). Indeed, once Sherman 
came into title of the property in question in June of 2010, it amended its Complaint to allege a 
breach of contract and sought attorney's fees against Global. Global has successfully defended 
this action. 
LC. § 12-120(3) provides another basis for an award of attorney's fees to Global since the 
gravamen of the transaction involved the alleged breach of a commercial cell tower lease. This 
Court has held that "[ w ]here a party alleges the existence of a contractual relationship of a type 
embraced by LC. § 12-120(3) ... that claim triggers the application of [LC. § 12-120(3)] and a 
prevailing party may recover fees even though no liability under a contract was established.'' 
Farmers Nat'/ Bankv. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 73,878 P.2d 762, 772 (1994). 
In the event that Global prevails on this Appeal it is entitled to an award of attorney's fees 
and costs on appeal under paragraph 15(f) of Exhibit A-1; LC.§ 12-120(3); LR.C.P. 54(e)(l) 
and I.A.R. 41. 
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CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed and Global should be awarded 
attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~ 'f day of April, 2014. 
WITHERSPOON KELLEY 
J~ P. Haze1,ISNo. 4980 
The Spokesman Review Building 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814-2146 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 2lf day of April, 2014, I caused two true and correct copies 
of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF to be served by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Erik P. Smith 
Erik P. Smith, P.C. 
607 Lakeside A venue 
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